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ARE RATINGS INFORMATIVE SIGNALS?
THE ANALYSIS OF THE NETFLIX DATA
IVAN MARYANCHYK
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A. This paper analyzes ratings as informative signals about the quality of movies. A
structural Bayesian learning model links the revealed experience utilities of raters, who are prior
consumers, to the product choice of the future consumers of the same good. I postulate that
movies are chosen based on the consumers prior beliefs and the precision of the signals provided
by the ratings. Consumers use the ratings signals more when more consumers have revealed
their preferences in the ratings. I specify and estimate a simulated maximum likelihood model
using the Netflix data on rental choices and ratings. The very rich data set allows me to identify
the effect of ratings on demand while controlling for the inherent popularity of each specific
DVD using fixed effects. The results demonstrate that the ratings provide signals of quality to
consumers. If the signal is based on only one rating, it is very noisy, and the consumer might
ignore it. As more consumers rate the DVD, the signal becomes more informative, and the re-
sults show that the consumers surplus increases. The estimation shows that the ratings system
has economically significant value. As 100 more people rate a DVD, the quantity demanded for
the newly released DVD can rise by as much as 35 percent. If Netflix were to offer DVDs with-
out providing the rating service, 88 percent more consumers would choose movies elsewhere.
Finally, the absence of the Netflix system with a high volume of ratings for each DVD would
cause consumers to rent a narrower selection of DVDs than what they currently rent from Netflix.
Specifically, the share of newly released DVDs would go up from 5 to 17 percent.
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I
More goods are sold online and delivered these days. While traditional shopping involves direct
inspection, trying, and testing, online shopping relies primarily on recommendations and rat-
ings. Since experience goods involve matching preferences with good attributes, buyers prefer
to collect as much information as possible. Information about quality and attributes does not
only come directly from retailers. We pay more attention to consumers’ and experts’ reviews
and ratings.
When sellers ask buyers to evaluate goods/services, they obtain a new attribute — rating (a
three–star hotel or a 5–star movie). Further, retailers bundle items they sell with information
services which include such quality signals (amazon.com, Netflix). Finally, consumers start
taking into account an additional signal about the quality or the experience utility. It takes time
to understand whether and to what extent could the consumer rely on ratings when buying a
good. If there is no horizontal differentiation, ratings are very close to quality signals. If there
is no vertical differentiation, ratings are some averaged consumers’ preferences.
In this paper, I consider several important questions. The first is about the nature of ratings:
are they signals about experience utility or the attributes? Second, do consumers differ in how
they learn from signals, i.e., in how they draw an idea about mean experience utility? Third,
how valuable is the system of such signalling in the economic sense: can we evaluate this
information in monetary terms?
One of the systems that allows studying how consumers learn from ratings (and learn how to
use them) is that offered by Netflix, an online DVD rental service offering flat rate rental–by–
mail to customers in the United States. Customers sequentially choose and queue movies via an
internet web site. A choice is defined by the information about observable attributes provided by
the Netflix web site or other sources. In addition to the “catalog” service, the site provides “taste
matching” options that help in finding a movie to watch (and preferably enjoy). Among the latter
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are the recommendations based on a consumer’s genre preferences, previous movie choice (the
same director, actors, or genre), and a consumer’s own feedback ratings (Cinematch). Besides
Netflix, consumers might rely on friends’ recommendations, other web sites, etc.
The most immediate information a consumer might take into account is the average rating by
the previous watchers within Netflix1. The average rating is the cumulative average of previous
consumers’ experience utilities. To make an optimal choice a consumer might try to see what
others’ experience utility was and use it as an experience utility signal. This signal should
have a higher precision if initial watchers had the same tastes as the consumer. The more
heterogeneous are the tastes of the previous consumers, the noisier is the quality signal.
If ratings are attributes (a “5–star hotel”), then the higher rated item has more. Everybody
should prefer 5–star movies. However, if the the ratings are only signals, then their precision is
important. For example, an experience utility signal “3” sent by a million of previous adopters
has more value to a consumer than an experience utility signal “5” from only one consumer.
If consumers differ in how they learn, they might agree on quality but behave differently. This
might happen because of the variation in the consumer–specific tastes toward expected quality.
The experience utility depends on quality but is not equivalent to it.
Finally, what is the value of ratings? Do they change the allocation of movies within the in–mail
delivery DVD market? Do they help reallocate demand between the conventional local store
DVD rental industry and in–mail delivery? Is there substitution between the outside and inside
options?
I assume that consumers know the precision of signals and use this knowledge to learn about
movies’ experience utility. To do this, I formulate a discrete choice model with a Bayesian–type
updating mechanism. Consumers incorporate prior beliefs and quality signals into the weighted
1Recently Netflix started providing two ratings: all users and users with tastes similar to given consumer’s. This
makes ratings less noisy quality signals. Data used in the research did not have this feature.
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average perceived quality before choosing a movie from the set of available. To estimate the
structural parameters of my model I maximize the simulated likelihood of the movie choice
sequences across consumers. I find that ratings are informative signals about movie quality. The
more votes submitted by the previous viewers, the more precise is the signal and the higher is
the value of information for consumers. Because ratings resolve some uncertainty about movie
quality, the structure of demand changes — consumers choose older movies more often. This
paper is organized as follows. In the next section I summarize some of the literature relevant to
this research. Then, I present the formal structural model, describe my empirical strategy, and
discuss some identification issues. Finally, I talk about data and results.
1. L
This research benefits from and contributes to the empirical literature on learning. ? introduced
the idea of Bayesian modeling of consumers purchasing behavior. Consumers in their model
learn about a single attribute — washing power of the detergent. This attribute is first unobserv-
able, but some information is delivered by advertising. After experiencing the good, a consumer
updates her prior belief about quality and acts accordingly.
?? also studies a model of consumer’s learning. In his model a buyer decides whether to buy
a new brand of yogurt after observing the advertising signal about the new brand. Two types
of signals can be delivered — informative and prestige signals. ?? shows that informative
advertising affects inexperienced consumers, while the prestige message of advertising could
affect both experienced and inexperienced consumers.
? study the behavior of ulcer patients that consume ulcer medications, learning the unknown
attributes of the good. Two types of taste heterogeneity are assumed — the match of medication
and the seriousness of the disease. Two types of signals are available to patients/doctors –
curative and symptomatic.
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? structurally model learning about health care plans from ratings. They show that ratings
provide signals about the quality of plans and estimate the economics value. They maintain that
because rating are not attributes but signals, even low ratings have value for consumers because
they help resolve some uncertainty about experience attributes or quality. ? evaluates the effect
of quality certification in a model where both reputation and signal enter the decision problem
about choice of childcare institution in a Bayesian manner.
This paper also contributes to the literature on movie demand and learning. Extensive research
on movies can be found in marketing literature. The key task there is to assess the influence of
the word–of–mouth (WOM) on movie revenues, sales of books, etc. ? show that future revenues
might depend on online movie reviews. They discuss whether there is a causal relationship
between experts’ reviews and revenues and reject this hypothesis. ? study the business value
of WOM and evaluate the correlation between WOM and motion picture revenues and suggest
using it as a forecasting tool. ? note recent developments — an escalation in the audience and
dynamics of word-of-mouth as well as the availability and measurability of WOM on the web
via consumers’ ratings. They claim that in 2003, 7% of movie-goers rated online. However,
they also show that the correlation between ratings, and thus tastes, of raters and non-raters
is very high, which allows forecasting the overall audience response based on the opinions of
online raters.
? builds a regression model that links WOM and box office revenues. It is shown that the
volume of WOM is a better predictor of revenues than the valence (average rating). ? study
the role of sequels and advertising expenditures in the motion picture industry. They show that
WOM and critics’ reviews attenuate the role of advertising and sequels. Among others, ? and
? estimate demand–like regression models that help in determining the financial success of
motion pictures. The general approach of such papers is to regress total box office on a set
of attributes, including marketing expenditures, ratings, Academy Awards, and other important
attributes.
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? studies WOM impact on theatrical movie admissions. He demonstrates that about 10% of the
variation in movie demand can be attributed to information distributed via WOM. He tackles the
problem of a demand saturation effect — the market for a title shrinks as more consumers watch
a movie. ? studies two types of seasonality in the motion picture industry — the seasonality in
the underlying demand and the seasonality of release dates. Fixed effects of movies’ quality are
identified by comparison of the market shares of good and bad movies in different time periods.
In other words, the patterns of demand decay of different movies identify their quality. The
important assumption here is the orthogonality of the decay patterns and of the release dates.
Einav estimates a nested logit discrete choice model with movie-weeks as nests.
? replicates ? using data on the home video industry to answer questions about the optimal
timing of movie releases. Assuming that preferences over theater films and home video films
are the same, the author replicates Einav’s result of no segmentation. The key idea of the paper
is to check for seasonality in the home video industry and compare it to the seasonality in theater
releases. Other home video seasonality papers are by ?. They study the video window — the
time between a movie’s release date and its video release. Their common finding is that studios
cluster their releases around July 4th but underestimate the potential of the season right after the
Labor day. One of the explanations is the common 6-month window between theatrical release
and DVD release. A film released in July has chances to add in sales via DVD release during
the Christmas gift season.
With regard to the key methodological literature, ? reviews the methods of qualitative response
analysis, including the cases of endogenous qualitative variables. ? provides a theoretical
justification of the extreme value random variable assumption for the nested logit model. ?
and ? provide insights about the methodology of differentiated product demand estimation. ?
provides key ideas of empirical strategy.
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2. T M
2.1. Learning about quality. Each period t there are Nt movies and an outside option to
choose from, and M consumers. The sets of movies vary with time because new movies are
added to the choice set. There are potentially infinitely many time periods. In each consumption
cycle t a consumer i chooses movie j. Each movie has a quality signal: a numerical rating that
is the average score given by a subset of previous consumers. Every w–th rater reports how she
liked the movie she watched.
After observing all attributes and considering quality signals, consumer i has to make a choice
among Nti movies. Consumer i has her own movie set at time t; she does not watch movies she
has seen before. If a movie is watched again, it is an example of an outside good. A watched
and an unwatched films are two different goods: consumers already know quality of a watched
movie when making a choice. If during time period t consumer i does not choose a movie,
she consumes an outside good. I assume that each time the consumer maximizes a one-period
expected utility2. The utility is:
(1) U(X jt, υi, δ j, εi jt) = X jtβ + υiδ j + εi jt
Consumer’s utility depends on her tastes υi, explicitly or implicitly observable characteristics of
movies X jt, idiosyncratic shocks unrelated to taste or preferences known to consumer i before
consumption but unknown to the econometrician i jt, and the quality δ j. This actual experi-
ence utility is known only after the good is consumed3. To choose a good, a consumer needs
2The problem is potentially dynamic. For instance, choosing a movie today leads to its dropout from the op-
portunity set tomorrow.The discounted sum of future expected utilities conditional on available information Iit is
maximized via an optimal movie selection cτ(Iiτ) at each time τ:
max
cτ(Iiτ) τ≥t
E
 ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tUicττ|Iit

However, such dynamic considerations might not be very important and an assumption about a short–sighted
consumer is not very strong. How many of us decide not to watch a movie today because it decreases the option
value for tomorrow?
3? uses index (t + 1) to describe this situation, which means the actual experience utility is known only before the
purchase of the next good, but not at the time t. One needs to consume the good to find out how it tasted.
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to guess δ j. The subtle nature of “experience utility” learned from expected quality demands
understanding how consumers (i) predict quality (prior beliefs), (ii) learn about quality (per-
ceived noisiness of ratings), and appreciate quality (preferences). These unobservable (for an
econometrician) facts need to be modeled.
Formally, experience utility depends on the latent quality measure and a consumer–specific taste
toward this quality: υiδ j. Consumers have prior beliefs about δ j: N(γi j, σ20). σ
2
0 is the varinace
of the prior beliefs about the true experience utility of a movie. Note, consumers might have
different means of their prior beliefs about quality.
They also believe that average ratings are themselves the product of other consumers’ revealed
preferences. As the number of viewers converges to the population size, ratings converge to
some population–average latent quality δ j. Consumers believe that the conditional distribution
of ratings is p(r jt|δ j)4. Knowing this relationship, consumers learn about mean quality from the
posterior distribution p(δ j|r jt). The noisiness depends on the number of previous raters.
Next, consumer i updates her beliefs with the ratings — the average scores of feedback submit-
ted by previous consumers. Netflix also reports, and consumers observe, the total number of
raters. Hence, the signal about quality consists of the rating itself and the number of raters that
contributed to this average score. Each feedback rating fr j supplied by one of the R jt raters up
to time t is a function of raters’ actual experience utility, some stochastic mapping of the actual
experience utility into the space of discrete ratings [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. If consumers believe that one
feedback rating has variance σ21, then by the CLT, the average rating observed by consumers
r jt = (
∑R jt
r=1 fr j)/R jt, will be approximately normally distributed
5 around the latent quality δ j
with variance σ21/R jt: r jt|δ j ∼ N(δ j, σ21/R jt). The posterior distribution of quality δ j after the
4Note, to believe that δ j is the society–average latent quality, one needs to assume that consumers that choose to
rate do not systematically differ in interpreting the latent quality. Otherwise, δ j is the raters’ latent quality. This
assumption however might not be too strong. For instance, ? demonstrated that the ratings of raters and non-raters
are highly correlated.
5Another possible distributional assumption is that the prior is distributed Dirichlet and signals are multinomial so
that the posterior is also Dirichlet.
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signal is observed is δ j|r jt,R jt ∼ N(δ jt, σ2jt). The mean of this distribution, the perceived quality
of movie j, is computed using Bayesian updating rule as a weighted average of the prior mean
and the signal:
δ jt = E[δ j|r jt,R jt] =
γi j/σ
2
0 + r jtR jt/σ
2
1
1/σ20 + R jt/σ
2
1
(2)
σ2jt =
1
1/σ20 + R jt/σ
2
1
(3)
To maximize her utility, consumer i needs to know her individual–specific perceived quality
υiδ j. Thus, the perceived experience utility at time t is expressed as:
(4) υiE[δ j|r jt,R jt] = υi
γi j/σ
2
0 + r jtR jt/σ
2
1
1/σ20 + R jt/σ
2
1
Note that the variance (??) in the posterior distribution depends on the variance of the prior and
the variance of the signal. As more consumers rate, the signal’s precision is higher, and the
posterior becomes more dependent on the average rating. Also, if signals are very noisy and
σ21  σ20, after comparatively few votes, consumer i might still put greater weight on her prior
beliefs. However, eventually, when R jt is large enough, more weight will be put on the signals.
2.2. Empirical specification. The expected utility for the inside good is specified as follows:
E(Ui jt|r jt,R jt) = X jtβ + υi
γi j/σ
2
0 + r jtR jt/σ
2
1
1/σ20 + R jt/σ
2
1
+ εi jt(5)
Note, it is impossible to jointly identify the variances for both the prior and the signal. To
demonstrate this, let me scale these parameters by factor c: σ2
′
0 = σ
2
0/c and σ
2′
1 = σ
2
1/c.
Observe, that the expected experience utility is unchanged:
E[δ j(σ2
′
0 , σ
2′
1 )|r jt,R jt] =
γi j/σ
2′
0 + r jtR jt/σ
2′
1
1/σ2′0 + R jt/σ
2′
1
=
c
c
γi j/σ
2
0 + r jtR jt/σ
2
1
1/σ20 + R jt/σ
2
1
= E[δ j(σ20, σ
2
1)|r jt,R jt]
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Hence, I normalize the variance parameters in the following way:
1/σ21
(1/σ20 + 1/σ
2
1)
= τ
1/σ20
(1/σ20 + 1/σ
2
1)
= (1 − τ)
The inside good expected utility is now specified as follows:
E(Ui jt|r jt,R jt) = X jtβ + υiγi j(1 − τ) + r jtτR jt1 − τ + τR jt + εi jt(6)
Note that expectation of the latent quality is individual–specific because of the dispersion in
the taste for quality υi and because priors are individual–specific. It is time–specific because
of time–varying signals. I assume that the outside good is chosen if it is not a movie from
the sample. The utility of the inside movie j depends on the explicit attributes X jt. The time–
invariant part encompasses the way a movie was produced and marketed, the choice of the
director, the actors, the budget, etc. It also depend the film–time–specific measure of movie’s
age calculated as current date minus the DVD release date6. β captures marginal tastes toward
observable movie characteristics.7
In sum, the specification structurally accounts for the a common content selection mechanism
employed by many online content providers suggesting consumers to differentiate media by
“Most Popular”, “Recently Added”, and “Highest Rated”. Demographic variables are not avail-
able in my data set8. The following information is fully observable and known by the consumers
and the econometrician (denote this zi jt): movie characteristics, including average ratings r jt,
6The longer the movie on the market, the more people know about it and, for example, the less they would take
into account/be influenced by advertising. Another interpretation of the age parameter is somewhat similar to
“reputation” (?). Customers have to rely on rating and experts’ reviews at the early stage of a film’s life. However,
with age, films form a “reputation”. Alternatively this slope captures the decay rate in a movie’s appeal (quality in
? or saturation in ?)
7Tastes for the characteristics βi could be modeled as random coefficients. In this version I do not use random
coefficients to describe heterogenous attitudes towards observable characteristics.
8To infer characteristics of consumers I might use pre–sample data (as in ?) or the one–day bulk ratings that are
the responses to Netflix’s suggestions to rate as many as possible to create consumer’s profile
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number of ratings R jt, age and time–invariant attributes X j. The actual choices of movies cit are
also observed.9
The following information is known to consumers and unknown to the econometrician: the
prior beliefs on movies’ experience utility γi j, taste for quality υi, and idiosyncratic shocks i jt.
The precision parameter τ is assumed constant across consumers and time.
The idiosyncratic tastes are modeled as i.i.d. Type 1 extreme value random variable.10. Con-
sumer i’s prior beliefs and tastes toward quality are modeled as follows:
 γi jln υi
 ∼ N
 γ jυ Σ
 , Σ =
 σ
2
γ 0
0 σ2υ

Prior beliefs about movie quality, and the log of the tastes, are normally distributed and are
not correlated.11 I empirically model the taste for quality as random. I simulate 20 random
draws from the above distribution and use them in estimation. The individual prior beliefs have
parameters that are random across individuals but have movie-specific parameters, γ j.
The vector of structural parameters θ = (β, γ j, σγ, υ, συ, τ) is estimated using the simulated
maximum likelihood method (SML). Note the natural restriction is 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. To use the
gradient–based SML nonlinear optimization routine, I reparametrized τ = Φ(t) , where Φ(·) is
the CDF of the standard normal distribution.
9In the Data section I discuss the unique features of data, assumptions, and the construction of variables.
10As an extention/variation of this model i jt could be modeled as the normal random variable. This would require
other estimation methods, e.g. integration via data augmentation using Gibbs sampling.
11Empirically, given a simulated bivariate standard normal draw ms = [ms1 ms2]
′ ∼ N(0, I) and γi j = γ j + γs,
υi = exp(υ + υs), Lms = [γs υs]′ ∼ N(0,Σ) if Σ = LL′. L is the lower triangular Cholesky factor of the covariance
matrix Σ. I have considered the case with a non–zero correlation between the tates and the priors.The covariance
matrix in this case is:
Σ =
(
σ2γ σγυ
σγυ σ
2
υ
)
=
(
σ2γ ρσγσυ
ρσγσυ σ
2
υ
)
The correlation should have been identified by the similarity in priors and tastes towards the same movies. Unfor-
tunately, data does not allow me to identify parameter ρ.
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The vector of mean prior beliefs about movies’ quality γ j is originally N–dimesional. This is
quite burdensome to estimate. To start with, one might make several simplifying assumptions.
Consider three films — “The Matrix”, “When Worlds Collide”, and “Mary Poppins”. If ceteris
paribus a consumer is indifferent between the three movies but all consumers have different
beliefs about cinema as such, it would be safe to assume equal prior expectations for all movies:
γ j = γ for all j.
Note, however that the first two are Science Fiction, the last is a family classic. Consumers on
average, probably, have different expectations about these two categories. For instance, SciFi
films are better on a big screen, while “Mary Poppins” is better to watch with one’s family at
home. Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that consumers have the same expectations about
movies in the same genre. Further, note that “When Worlds Collide” is a comparatively low–
budget SciFi film from fifties. If consumers have different expectations about films in different
genre–budget categories, Worlds’ prior expectation would be different from that of Matrix’s. In
theory, one might go as far as to maintain the initial assumption that all movies have different
prior expected quality. I however prefer to believe that, for instance, customers’ beliefs about
two consequent movies of the James Bond franchise are the same. Hence the prevalent empirical
specification includes fixed prior belief effects for each movie–budget category.
Recall, i jt are assumed to be distributed Type 1 Extreme Value i.i.d. Given data and parameters,
the probability that consumer i chooses movie j at time t is analytically expressed as follows:
Pr
(
cit = c
(
zi jt; θ
))
=
∫
expUi jt
1 +
Nit∑
k=1
expUikt
p(dγi j|θ)p(dυi|θ)(7)
The likelihood for consumer i is the joint probability of her choice history through Ti time peri-
ods. The integration is over the consumer–specific prior beliefs γi j and tastes towards quality υi.
This consumers heterogeneity is time–persistent, so that one needs to integrate the likelihoods
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of the series of choices for each consumer.
Li
(
θ|zi jt
)
=
∫
Pr
({
cit = c
(
zi jt; θ
)}Ti
t=1
)
p(dγi j|θ)p(dυi|θ)
=
∫ Ti∏
t=1
Pr
(
cit = c
(
zi jt; θ
))
p(dγi j|θ)p(dυi|θ)(8)
Note that empirically this likelihood is the function of NS -dimensional vectors υs and γs.
Hence, integrating the expression in (??) I obtain the simulated likelihood:
̂Li
(
θ|zi jt
)
=
1
NS
NS∑
s=1
Ti∏
t=1
Pr
(
cit = c
(
zi jt; θ
))
(9)
In other words, since both prior beliefs and tastes toward quality are persistent unobservables,
I need to integrate them over the entire sequence of each consumer’s choices. The simulated
log–likelihood function encompassing choices of M consumers has the following form:
L
(
θ|zi jt
)
=
M∑
i=1
ln ̂Li
(
θ|zi jt
)
=
M∑
i=1
ln

1
NS
NS∑
s=1
Ti∏
t=1
expUi jt
1 +
Nit∑
k=1
expUikt

.
2.3. Identification. There are two sets of parameters to identify in this model. The first set
comprises the marginal utilities towards explicitly or implicitly observable characteristics. These
are identified by the comparative market shares of movies with different characteristics. For in-
stance, if a movie with a higher budget is chosen more often, all other things being constant,
then the respective β estimate would be positive. The slope of age is identified by the relative
frequency of choices of movies with different age.
The second set of parameters describes the learning process. After time invariant and age –
related components in the movies appeal are filtered out by X jt, the leftover is taken by the
expected quality parameters. Note, that film–specific or film category–specific time invariant
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dummy variables, parameters of the prior beliefs distribution, do not enter linearly into the ex-
pected utility. How much variation is taken on by these variables depends on the informativeness
of the signals and consumer–specific tastes for quality — experience utility.
Neither we nor consumers observe the posterior mean of quality or the actual experience utility.
Consumers are governed by their beliefs and tastes. The only thing that points towards better
or worse expected quality and informativeness of signals is the variation in the behavior of a
consumers. They would pay more attention to ratings if they are good signals and less attention
in the case of poor signalling quality. How fast consumers come to realize that, with a large
enough set of feedback ratings the signal comes very close to represent the society–average
quality would point towards a difference in the two precision parameters. The marginal effect
of posterior quality on the choice would identify υ and the dispersion in the individual–specific
reaction will identify συ. The parameters γ j and σ2γof the priors distribution are identified by
variation in a given consumer’s choices among movies of different categories that have the same
characteristics and by the fact that different consumers choose different movies even if X jt, R jt,
and r jt are the same.
3. D   
3.1. Data description and discussion. Recently Netflix announced a competition called The
Netflix Prize meant to improve the algorithm used to suggest movies based on the information
about the preference profiles of users. Such preference profiles are constructed using consumers
feedback ratings. Netflix needs to recommend movies a consumer would really like. The com-
petition gives access to the data:
...The movie rating files contain over 100 million ratings from 480 thousand
randomly-chosen, anonymous Netflix customers over 17 thousand movie titles.
The data were collected between October, 1998 and December, 2005 and reflect
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the distribution of all ratings received during this period. The ratings are on a
scale from 1 to 5 (integral) stars. To protect customer privacy, each customer id
has been replaced with a randomly-assigned id. The date of each rating and the
title and year of release for each movie id are also provided...
Netflix’s data has names as title attributes (with identifiers). All other useful data was col-
lected from several sources — IMDB12 as well as Home Theater Info13 and Michael’s Movie
Mayhem(MMM)14.
An important data feature is that Netflix provides the feedback ratings but not actual consump-
tion. First, I could assume that each feedback rating is related to a movie rented from the Netflix
system. This is not necessarily true. A better way would be to sample only such consumption
paths that are consistent with the natural renting activity given the available tariff plans. In
other words, if a consumer rates 20 movies a day, I consider it to be just bulk rating activity. If
a consumer rates on average 2-3 movies a day, I consider it to be renting–and–rating process.
Figure ?? in the Appendices depicts typical patterns of feedback ratings I observe. The number
of ratings per day are on the vertical axis and the calendar days of 2004 and 2005 are on the
horizontal axis. All the graphs depict consumers that watch, return, and rate. Note, however,
consumers could rate many movies at once, which might be the case of the bulk rating invited
by Netflix. The top left and the bottom right graphs represent a typical story. These consumers
followed Netflix’s instructions to rate as many movies as possible to create their profile and
generate good recommendations. Then they became tired with the process and stopped. Con-
sumer 2 probably has done this before the observed period. Finally, Consumer 3 comes back to
Netflix and rates many movies at once from time to time.
12imdb.com
13www.hometheaterinfo.com
14dvdlist.kazart.com
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Probably, the most straightforward way to ensure that ratings used in the estimation are closely
related to consumption is to choose ratings that happen once a day. It is unlikely that a person
comes to the web site and rates one movie if she did not watch it recently. Most probably, it
is some consumption experience that made her do this. The first–best would be a case when a
consumer watches a Netflix’s DVD and rates it as soon as Netflix sends a “We received your
DVD” email with the suggestion to click on rating stars. It is quite reasonable to presume
that among these ratings one might find movies from Blockbuster or elsewhere. But since a
consumer goes to the Netflix’s web site to rate it, she might have seen Netflix’s rating. The most
prevalent Netflix tariff plan is “3 DVDs–at–a–time”, hence I assume that an average consumer
rates no more then 3 movies at once. Figure ?? depicts the same consumers’ ratings as Figure
??, but trimmed — I delete all the occurrences of four or more rating per day.
3.2. Variables construction. The entire set of ratings by 464262 customers rating 17001 titles
in 1998 – 2005 consists of 22967929 observations. I have concentrated on the two last years
in the data — 2004 and 2005 — when the set of movies became large enough. Next, I have
collapsed the data to the weekly level. I have randomly selected 12528 consumers who actively
rated during this period.15
Table?? summarizes this sample. My average consumer rated 204 movies over 104 weeks. In
this sample, the average consumer rates during 96 weeks. Some consumers start rating from
the first week, others come into the sample later on. If a consumer does not rate during a week,
she is assumed to choose an outside good. An average consumer chooses an outside good 33
weeks during two years. Finally, note that many consumers choose several movies per calendar
week. In this case, for estimation purposes, I assume that consumers have different number of
movie–weeks per year.
15I would prefer using the entire sample of data. However, even with this sample size it took me about 6 days to
estimate the model with 56 parameters.
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Many attributes of movies are defined at the production stage by producers, director, actors, etc.
These are time-invariant. Movies with higher budgets would generate higher interest. Further,
a blockbuster film has a better chance to be heard of. Thus the more people have seen a movie
in theaters, the more publicity it gets via word–of–mouth. Finally, the more people talk about a
movie, the higher the chances are that somebody else would also like to see it.
To control for the initial higher investment in movies I collect data on movie budgets from
the IMDB website. To account for differences in word–of–mouth as a potential channel of
information dissemination about movies I collect data on total box office revenues. As shown
in Table ??, the spread in the budgets is quite sizable: from negligible to 200 million US$.
Revenue vary as well. Some movies go directly to video release and thus do not have theater–
related publicity. Other movies have total theater grosses measured in hundreds of million of
dollars. The average budget is around 15 million dollars and the average gross total is around
26 million dollars. There is a reasonable positive correlation of 0.57 between the budget and
the box office data. The budget does not fully predict the potential box office. Generally there
is a wide range of movies with various budget sizes that generate quite uniformly distributed
box office proceeds. The total number of movies in the sample is defined by the availability of
financial data — 7705. All other films are considered to be part of the outside good.
Another variable that helps in identifying and filtering out the implicitly observable appeal of
movies is the total number of the feedback ratings submitted by IMDB users. I consider this data
a proxy for other information about a movie that a Netflix consumer might take into account. I
refer to it as “popularity”. Arguably, this aggregate would reflect the relative success credited to
the actors, the director, etc. Movies with a higher total amount of the IMDB ratings tend to be
more famous and more actively discussed. Note in Table ?? that the data on the amount of the
Netflix and IMDB ratings is comparable. Their correlation is 0.7. However, keep in mind an
important difference. I observe the dynamics of the amount of the ratings in Netflix and use it to
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model the precision of the quality signal. I do not observe the dynamics of the amount of IMDB
ratings and use the “final” value as an exogenous source of variation in movies’ popularity.
To account for the fact that consumers might have different preferences for, or prior beliefs about
genres, I construct genre dummy variables. Table ?? summarizes this information. The most
represented genres are drama (1918 movies, 24.9%), comedy (1824 movies, 23.7%), and action
(1054 movies, 13.7%). Miscellaneous genres (game–show, history, reality–TV, and sport) are
collected into the category “others”.
In the set of implicitly or explicitly observable attributes I include the movie’s age, i.e. the
time elapsed since release. Sometimes consumers prefer new movies (blockbuster effect) and
sometimes they would wait in order to be convinced that a movie is likable (sleeper movie).
Release dates were collected from the IMDB web site and the age in days is calculated. Table
?? summarizes weekly data on time–varying variables. Note that the age of movies varies from
0 (just released) to 33400 days (early 20th century). I consequently transform age, popularity,
and financial variables into logarithmic form.
The number of raters (in thousands) and the average rating is used to model the consumer’s
learning process. Note that the average rating changes as more consumers submit their opin-
ions. Figure ?? depicts typical trends in the average ratings. “Harry Potter and the Prisoner of
Azkaban” demonstrates an initial spike. Then the average rating trends down and finally con-
verges to its long–run average. The DVD release of “Mary Poppins” also experiences an initial
surge in average rating, probably, thanks to devotees’ feedback. The DVD release of the Sci
Fi classics “When Worlds Collide” quickly converges to its long–run average. “The Matrix”
has the average rating that had converged to its long–run level before the beginning of 2004.
Finally, “Lost in Translation”, initially having high ratings converged to the lower level in the
end.
18
3.3. Estimation Results. I report Simulated Maximum Likelihood estimation results of three
specifications in Table ?? and Table ??. The asymptotic variance–covariance matrix is ob-
tained via numeric differentiation of the individual–specific likelihood functions and inverting
the outer–product of the resulting gradients. The standard errors of the parameter τ is computed
using the delta method.
First, I assume that consumers have the same mean prior beliefs about the quality of all movies
and include only one prior quality parameter to be estimated (Specification 1). Then I assume
that consumers differentiate movies according to genres. There are 17 more parameters to be
estimated in Specification 2. Finally, I assume that consumers differentiate between films in
separate budget–genre categories (Specification 3) — 57 parameters. I report results in two
tables. Table ?? shows the key structural parameters from the three specifications and Table ??
reports the estimates of the corresponding group–specific mean prior quality beliefs.
Consider first Table ??. All three specifications produce comparable results. Note that the
estimates are very precise thanks to the comparatively large data set consisting of about 2.5
million consumers’ choices. The log of age has a negative estimate: consumers generally prefer
newer films. The log of the number of IMDB ratings is a good predictor of choice: the more
popular a movie, the higher the probability that consumers discover it via word–of–mouth or
other information channels. In other words, the more a movie is discussed, the higher is the
probability that a consumer would like to try to watch it.
Both the log of budget and the log of gross box office proceeds positively affect consumer’s
utility and thus the probability of choice. Note that the percentage change in the budget has a
higher effect than the percentage change in the gross box office. This can be attributed to the fact
that higher budget usually means (i) higher marketing spending that directly attracts customers
and (ii) higher initial investment in better quality — top director and actors, good screenplay,
etc. The higher gross box office is another proxy for popularity and word–of–mouth. These
effects could already be captured by the IMDB popularity variable.
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Let me turn to the learning parameters. Here, the values from three specifications are also com-
parable. The inclusion of disaggregated prior beliefs naturally slightly decreases the estimate of
the standard deviation of the consumers tastes around the mean prior beliefs. The mean of the
random consumer–specific taste toward quality, calculated as E(υi) = eυ+σ
2
υ/2, is 0.926, 0.937,
and 0.926, depending on the specification. The variance, calculated as Var(υi) = (eσ
2
υ − 1)e2υ+σ2υ
varies between 0.03 and 0.06. In other words, consumers are not much dispersed in how they
value expected quality.
Consumers, however, disagree on prior beliefs about movie quality as demonstrated by the the
comparatively high estimates of σγ: 8.4, 7.6 and 6.1 respectively. Even with predominantly
negative estimates of means, this potentially generates many positive consumer–specific prior
beliefs. These estimated means are presented in Table ??. In Specification 1 the mean of all
prior valuations is estimated to be -11. Specification 2 shows how genre–specific prior beliefs
are dispersed around this mean. Specification 3 further disaggregates average prior expectations
for genre–budget categories — movies with budgets higher than $80 million, $5–$80 million,
and less than $5 million.
There are several interesting results here. First, some high–budget movies have quite low prior
quality beliefs, second, movies with higher budgets generally have comparatively low expec-
tations about quality. The first result could be addressed by the existence of only a few high
budget films in some genres. The second result could be clarified with the following example.
High–budget movies are often watched in the theaters. Hence, if they are rented from Netflix,
they will already have been rated many times by the previous audience. Thus, the quality signal
from ratings should be very strong to outweigh such cautious prior.
The parameter of the relative precision of the quality signals 1/σ
2
1
(1/σ20+1/σ
2
1)
is estimated to be 0.93,
hence 1/σ
2
0
(1/σ20+1/σ
2
1)
is 0.07. The results do not vary with the specification and are very precise.
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These numbers are more easily understood with a data example. Consider the three previously
mentioned films: “Mary Poppins”, “The Matrix”, and “When Worlds Collide”. In Table ?? I
report the expected posterior mean quality for different ratings and the number of raters. Note
that at the very beginning of the two–year period both “Mary Poppins” and “When Worlds
Collide” had negative expected posterior quality due to two facts: the negative prior belief
and the low precision of the quality signal. The average rating of “Mary Poppins” was almost
the same by the end of the period. However since many people rated, the precision increased
substantially and the quality expectations were noticeably upgraded. The precision of “When
Worlds Collide” did not increase as much, but those that watched and rated have bumped up
the average rating and thus the expected average quality. Finally, “The Matrix” maintained an
average rating of 4.2 all the time and the increased precision of this signal only slightly raised
the expected quality.
3.4. Model Fit. In order to test my estimator I perform two exercises. First, I perform a Monte
Carlo study. I generate several sets of simulated consumers and predict their choices given
the vector of arbitrary parameter values. Then, I use my SML estimator to estimate these
parameters. Second, I simulate consumer choices using the actual estimated parameter values
and compared the distribution of simulated movies to the actual choices in the data. Table ??
reports the results of the Monte Carlo.
For the Monte Carlo, I have created 20 data sets consisting of choices made by 400 simulated
consumers. Compare the actual and the mean of the estimated parameters in Table ??. The
model estimates these arbitrary parameters quite precisely. The standard deviation reported in
the third column is based on the sample of 20 Monte Carlo simulations. Note, that on average
the exercise produces precise estimates. Some parameters, e.g. the log of gross box office and
the log of the budget, are less precise. Others have rather small sample standard deviations,
which means that the model is identified even with the smaller data sample.
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In Table ?? I report the shares of movie choices by genre in the actual data and in the simulated
data. Notice that the model quite accurately predicts market shares of different genres. Only
Action genre is slightly under–predicted by the model. Finally, consider the distribution of
choices by the release year in Figure ??. The shapes of the two distributions are comparable.
However, the shares of the two years — 2003 and 2004 — are underestimated by the model.
3.5. Welfare Analysis. In theory, additional information makes consumers change their be-
havior: a different set of movies would be chosen conditional on the information signals about
quality. It is true that consumers might prefer movies with higher average ratings. However,
when a movie rating goes down, it does not mean that consumer utility will decrease. Con-
sumers will switch to a different choice and the resulting utility might go up.
One of the key purposes of this research is to evaluate the benefit of information for consumers.
If ratings indeed function as quality signals, consumers might enjoy increased utility levels
and agree to pay more for the service or, alternatively, stay with the current service provider
longer. To compute the difference in the consumer surplus I simulate the counterfactual mean
utilities under the assumption of no quality signals from ratings. In other words, I assume that
ratings are completely uninformative so that consumers make their choice based on the explicit
characteristics and the prior believes only. I follow ? who face a similar problem with the
health plan report cards used as quality signals. Let Ui jt(I) denote the mean utility of movie j
for consumer i at time t given the information state. I = 1 if the decision is made taking ratings
into account and I = 0 if ratings are not taken into consideration. The individual–time–specific
difference in the consumer surplus measure the value of information and could be a proxy for
the service quality. It is calculated as follows:
∆CS it = ln
Ni∑
j=1
expUi jt(I = 1) − ln
Ni∑
j=1
expUi jt(I = 0)
+
Ni∑
j=1
P∗i jtUi jt(I = 1) −
Ni∑
j=1
P∗i jtUi jt(I = 0)
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The first line of the above formula makes use of the logit utility shocks and represents the
difference in maximum utility in two information states. The second line is the difference in
the mean utilities in two states with the actual probabilities of informed choices P∗i jt used as
weights. Overall, it is a difference between ex–post counterfactual utility from movies chosen
with ratings and ex–post utility from movies chosen without ratings.
The value of information is shown in Figure ??. The top left panel plots the value of ratings for
the history of choices of a representative consumer. Note, that this value is always positive and
is fluctuating around 13 utility units. Also note that there is a monotonic growth in the average
value of information per movie. This could be attributed to two factors. First, as more feedback
ratings are submitted by the consumers, ratings become more informative and hence bring more
value to consumers. Second, it could also be true that the choices are more affected by ratings
because consumers enjoy the results of better informed decision.
I aggregate the value of information across consumers and report the overall weekly sum of
the value of information and the the mean of the value of information per choice in bottom left
and top right panels respectively. Note that the average value of information per choice stays
positive all the time and is monotonically increasing entire period up until the last couple of
weeks. A similar slight drop in the value of information could be noticed during the 53 and
54 weeks. These are seasonal effects of Christmas holidays when consumers might substitute
more to the outside good — go to the movies.
Lastly, I plot the number of total movie choices against the average value of information for the
entire sample. The majority of consumers make about 170–180 choices with mean being about
204 choices. The average value of information is about 13.08 utility units per choice. However,
I find no clear relationship between the frequency of choices and the mean value of information.
3.6. Counterfactual Analysis. I perform counterfactual analysis using the estimated structural
parameters to assess the effect of ratings on the rental behavior. First, I assume that consumers
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do not take into account ratings and choose movies based on the observable attributes and prior
beliefs about quality. Apparently, the ratings matter much in this model. With ratings, my
model predicts that about 15.27% of the choices would be in favor of the outside good. Without
ratings, this share increases to 90.01%. In the absence of ratings consumers will substitute to
choosing DVD movies from other sources or going to the theaters. In other words, ratings are
an integral and crucial part of the Netflix movie selection mechanism.
I dissect the simulated data to understand how ratings shape the distribution of choices. First, I
concentrate on the movie release date. Recall, that ratings are supposed to help discover movies
what are not explicitly advertised — old, foreign, independent, ets. Netflix accumulated a huge
movie base and hopes that their customers would be able to choose DVDs they will enjoy. At
the same time, it is also less costly to deliver films that do not require revenue sharing with
studios.
Let me show that ratings indeed perform this function well. Consider Figure ??. I build two
CDF graphs that reveal the distribution of chosen movies with and without ratings. The distri-
bution of the choices release years with ratings clearly second order stochastically dominates
the distribution of choices without ratings. In other words, ratings help consumers chose films
more evenly distributed over release year scale. On the contrary, without ratings, consumers
would prefer extreme release years, mainly newer movies. Simulation shows that without rat-
ings the share of movies produced in 2005 would increase from 4.9% to 17.11% and the share
of 2004 movies — from 15.6% to 16.2%.
Figure ?? reveals an even sharper result. Here, I depict the CDFs of the movies released after
1990. Note, that the “No Ratings” distribution first order stochastically dominates the “With
Ratings” distribution. In other words, without ratings, the probability mass shifts towards the
newer DVDs. This proves Netflix point about the usefulness of the ratings system in shifting
demand towards older movies.
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Finally, Table ?? and Figure ?? dissect simulated data into genres. Notice, that the composition
of genres changes without ratings. Consumers would less frequently watch action, comedy,
horror and thriller films. On the other hand, without ratings more dramas, documentary, adven-
ture, crime, and SciFi films would be chosen. That is, ratings are important for the first subset
of genres, and less so for the second. Probably, it is easier to agree upon experience utility of
comedies and action movies and hence ratings are more precise quality signals. On the other
hand, it is hard to agree on the quality of dramas due to the heterogeneity in preferences towards
such movies.
3.7. Market model. It is very important to understand what is the monetary value of the in-
formation for consumers and for producers. To do that I combine the demand and supply sides
of the market for the online DVD subscription plans. One of the possible ways to proceed is
to estimate a Berry–style logit demand model that would show how Netflix can use the value
consumers derive from information to create brand loyalty. Data on pricing would allow to set
a monetary value on quality signals and hence evaluate the private dollar value of the ratings
voluntarily submitted by prior consumers. Adding the supply-side analysis allows to better
control for endogeneity in the demand side and to examine how the ratings system improves
profitability for Netflix.
Netflix shares revenues on new DVD releases with the studios but not on older DVDs. To the
extent that the ratings system causes people to shift toward renting older DVDs, Netflix retains a
higher share of the revenues from its subscription plans. I plan to simulate counterfactual profit
under the assumption that consumers do not use ratings as quality signals. The simulations
from the estimation would show how the information generated by the ratings system influences
Netflixs profit as well as the pricing and strategic decisions made by its competitors in the DVD
rental market. I plan to demonstrate how firms can provide information that generates value to
consumers while also gaining a competitive advantage in the market.
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The market under consideration is new and growing. Consumers either go to local rental stores
less substituting with the Netflix–like service or switch completely. Hence the market size is
an increasing function of product quality. One of the most important determinants of quality is
the ability to make informed decision taking into account average ratings. Hence, I specify a
quality measure to be the value of information discussed above qt = ∆CS t. Firms with better
quality enjoy higher market shares. In addition, the cost structure of Netflix depends on the type
of movies rented by consumers: new films under the revenue sharing agreements or old, foreign
films, and films form independent producers that have linear prices.
Consider market demand for a DVD plan subscription. There are i = 1 . . .M consumers and
ti = 1 . . . T time periods. Each time period t a consumers maximizes expected utility choosing
between inside and the outside goods. The utility is specified as follows:
Uit = Xtαx − ptαp + qtiαqi + ε1it
Uit0 = 0 + ε0it
Note, choosing the inside good, a consumer benefits from the attributes Xt and the experience
utility qti and has to pay a monthly price pt. Consumers could also choose to switch to the
outside option if the mean utility of the inside good is negative.
Experience utility, or the taste for Netflix, qtiα
q
i is a function of quality, a consumer–specific
difference in the surplus delivered by ratings and an the ability to make more informed decisions.
Given distributional assumption on the unobserved utility shock εit the market share of Netflix
is the function of the product quality: st = s(qt, ·).
Assuming non–cooperative Bertrand competition, per–period firm’s profit could be expressed
as:
pi(pq . . . pL, I) = Mt
L∑
l=1
(ptl − mctl(λt(I), ·))stl(qt(I), pt, ·) − FC
26
Note that profit depends on the choice of the information regime I and qt(I = 0) = 0 To compute
the difference in the producer’s surplus pi(I = 1) − pi(I = 0), I need to estimate mct(λt(I), ·) and
st(qt(I), pt, ·) For the firm with one tariff plan FOC are:
st(qt(I), pt, ·) + (pt − mct(λt(I), ·))δst(qt(I), pt, ·)
δpt
= 0
I estimate market share equation using Berry inversion
ln(st) − ln(st0) = Xtαx − ptαp + qtαq + εt
After computing market shares I can back up the marginal cost conditional on information
regime.
mc1t (·) =
[
δst(qt(I), pt, ·)
δpt
]−1
st(qt(I), pt, ·) + pt
This part is in progress. The results will be reported upon completion.
4. C
This paper analyzes ratings as signals about quality of movies. I estimate a structural Bayesian
learning model that relates votes submitted by the previous consumers to choices of future
consumers. The results of this research point towards the importance of information in markets
for experience goods. It is very hard to predict quality of a movie and hence consumers need to
rely on the informative signals from the “early adopters”.
Feedback collected by Netflix and reported as the average rating and the number of raters plays
an important role in the choice of the late adopters — consumers that need to maximize their
experience utility from a movie, especially if the choice set is very large. I show that consumers
do pay attention to ratings, but only if the amount of raters is substantially large. This reiterates
the importance of the information accumulation by Netflix.
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Simulation results demonstrate that in the absence of ratings consumers substitute heavily to-
wards the outside good — the share of the outside good choices increases from 15 to 90 per-
cent. In addition, the composition of the movie choices changes as well. Consumers prefer
newer films to older. Consumers might share the view on the quality of some genres, like action
or comedy. On the other hand, we disagree about quality of dramas because of multitude of
preferences. Movies of the first type benefit from information signals more than movies of the
second type. When ratings are not used, consumers substitute from action and comedy towards
drama and crime films.
I estimate the individual–choice specific difference in the consumer surplus. This value is pos-
itive and monotonically increasing over time. Information contained in ratings appreciates as
more feedback votes are collected by Netflix.
The results of this research will be used in the study of how firms utilize a retail system with
the quality signaling mechanism to create switching costs for consumers and exercise market
power. This research will answer questions about the monetary value of information. The model
of the market for the DVD tariff plans will help assessing the effect of information on the profits
of firms and the level of competition.
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A A. S   
T 1. Summary statistics of the consumer sample.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of movies 204.4 41.1 113 346
Total weeks 95.9 8.5 71 104
Outside good weeks 33.1 12.9 1 76
Number of consumers 12528
Total number of choices 2467685
T 2. Movies by genre.
Genre Number of movies Share
Action 1,054 13.7
Adventure 309 4.0
Animation 236 3.1
Biography 207 2.7
Comedy 1,824 23.7
Crime 393 5.1
Documentary 512 6.6
Drama 1,918 24.9
Family 147 1.9
Fantasy 72 0.9
Horror 352 4.6
Music 133 1.7
Musical 63 0.8
Romance 86 1.1
Sci-Fi 87 1.1
Thriller 179 2.3
Western 55 0.7
Others 78 1.0
Total 7,705 100.0
T 3. Summary statistics for time–invariant movie attributes.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Release year 1992 14 1914 2005
Number of ratings in Netflix database 11523 24050 3 232944
Number of ratings in IMDB databse 9156 22195 5 363293
Budget in million US$ 15.618 19 0 200
Box office in million US$ 26.229 72.423 0 1835.3
N 7705
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T 4. Summary statistics for the time–varying variables.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Week 55.62 29.53 1 104
Movies age 5564.70 5987.15 0 33400
The average Netflix rating 3.23 0.48 1 5
The number of raters 6684.23 14890.44 1 232046
N 741589
T 5. SML estimates of three specification: (1) the same prior beliefs about
all movies, (2) different priors according to genres, (3) different priors for
budget–genre categories.
Same priors Priors by Gennre Priors by Genre/Budget
Constant -11.489 (0.0063) -11.739 (0.0070) -11.947 (0.0135)
Log of Age -2.778 (0.0007) -2.851 (0.0008) -2.988 (0.0015)
Log of IMDB Popularity 1.985 (0.0027) 2.070 (0.0030) 2.144 (0.0057)
Log of Budget 0.177 (0.0002) 0.191 (0.0003) 0.212 (0.0006)
Log of Gross Box Office 0.013 (0.0001) 0.010 (0.0002) 0.006 (0.0003)
Quality taste parameter υ -0.104 (0.0009) -0.097 (0.0010) -0.091 (0.0023)
Quality taste parameter συ 0.252 (0.0008) 0.252 (0.0008) 0.247 (0.0022)
Standard deviation of prior σγ 8.276 (0.0232) 7.613 (0.0216) 7.141 (0.0458)
Relative ratings precision τ 0.936 (0.0005) 0.933 (0.0005) 0.930 (0.0009)
T 6. SML estimates of prior beliefs
Budget,$ million > 80 5 – 80 < 5
Action -11.9 (0.04) -14.8 (0.12) -11.0 (0.08) -9.6 (0.11)
Adventure -11.5 (0.05) -16.0 (0.30) -10.5 (0.11) -4.9 (0.15)
Animation -16.2 (0.05) -35.6 (0.37) -17.2 (0.11) -6.6 (0.23)
Biography -10.8 (0.05) -14.5 (0.79) -7.8 (0.10) -25.7 (0.22)
Comedy -9.5 (0.03) -12.1 (0.29) -9.3 (0.07) -7.7 (0.07)
Crime -10.2 (0.05) -300.0 (15.69) -10.8 (0.10) -5.2 (0.12)
Documentary -7.7 (0.03) -7.8 (0.08) -6.7 (0.07)
Drama -8.9 (0.03) -11.3 (0.37) -8.9 (0.07) -7.3 (0.07)
Family -11.3 (0.07) -80.0 (9.58) -11.1 (0.16) -10.1 (0.21)
Fantasy -12.4 (0.13) -253.2 (25.97) -14.9 (0.32) -4.8 (0.39)
Horror -11.8 (0.04) -455.1 (33.18) -10.4 (0.13) -16.4 (0.11)
Music -8.9 (0.05) -8.2 (0.14) -8.9 (0.11)
Musical -9.7 (0.10) -10.0 (0.21) -5.7 (0.25)
Romance -10.2 (0.08) -10.4 (0.14) -3.2 (0.25)
Sci-Fi -8.4 (0.07) -320.2 ( 24.79) -9.1 (0.19) -5.3 (0.18)
Thriller -12.6 (0.06) -8.3 (0.13) -20.0 (0.16)
Western -8.6 (0.11) -8.3 (0.24) -8.1 (0.35)
Others -6.9 (0.07) -4.7 (0.19) -7.0 (0.15)
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T 7. Computation of the posterior mean quality.
Week Prior Rating # of Ratings (’000) Precision Posterior
Marry Poppins 1 -10 3.8 0.005 0.005 -8.50
104 -10 4.1 55.297 51.426 3.80
The Matrix 1 -8.6 4.2 38.926 36.201 3.88
104 -8.6 4.2 140.227 130.411 3.90
When Worlds Collide 1 -3.7 2.7 0.009 0.008 -2.81
104 -3.7 3.6 1.850 1.721 3.08
T 8. Monte Carlo Results.
Actual values Mean of estimated values s.d.
Constant -8.00 -7.943 0.224
Log of Age -2.00 -1.971 0.026
Log of IMDB Popularity 1.00 0.981 0.089
Log of Budget 0.30 0.256 0.230
Log of Gross Box Office 0.02 0.017 0.084
Prior -8.00 -8.311 0.444
Quality taste parameter υ -0.05 -0.068 0.030
Quality taste parameter συ 0.15 0.151 0.006
Standard deviation of prior σγ 7.00 7.249 0.359
Relative ratings precision parameter t 0.50 0.509 0.024
# of Monte Carlo Experiments 20
# of Simulated Draws 20
# of Simulated Consumers 400
# of Choices per Consumer 104
# of Choices Total 41600
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T 9. Distribution of movie choices by genre — actual and simulated
Genre Actual (%) Simulated with ratings
(%)
Simulated without rat-
ings (%)
Action 19.79 22.78 3.06
Adventure 5.34 5.57 7.66
Animation 2.53 4.28 0.57
Biography 4.23 4 4.07
Comedy 27.22 22.97 18.55
Crime 6.81 5.87 11.02
Documentary 2.8 2.51 10.63
Drama 24.1 22.51 24.58
Family 0.64 1.18 0.24
Fantasy 0.44 0.74 2.12
Film-Noir 0.02 0.02 0.02
History 0.01 0.03 0.03
Horror 2.1 2.88 0.61
Music 0.12 0.16 0.58
Musical 0.3 0.38 0.52
Mystery 0.33 0.34 0.99
Reality-TV 0.13 0.06 0.38
Romance 0.75 0.96 0.81
Sci-Fi 0.7 0.71 5.27
Short 0.25 0.13 3.31
Sport 0.01 0.02 2.05
Thriller 1.15 1.58 0.57
War 0.04 0.04 1.89
Western 0.17 0.28 0.48
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F 1. Feedback ratings patterns of 4 typical consumers used to calculate
average ratings and the amount of ratings submitted
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F 2. Trimmed feedback ratings patterns of 4 typical consumers used to
construct consumption choices
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F 3. Average rating patterns of 5 typical movies.
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F 4. The distribution of movies by release dates — actual and simulated data.
36
F 5. CDFs of movies by release dates; all movies
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F 6. CDFs of movies by release dates; movies released after 1990
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F 7. The distribution of movies by genre
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F 8. Consumer Surplus
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